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Abstract
Traditional approaches to rootkit detection [24] [45] [25] [34] assume the execution of
code at a privilege level below that of the operating system kernel, with the use of
virtual machine technologies to enable the detection system itself to be immune from
the virus or rootkit code. In this thesis, we approach the problem of rootkit detec-
tion from the standpoint of tracing and instrumentation techniques, which work from
within the kernel and also modify the kernel’s run–time state to detect aberrant con-
trol flows. We wish to investigate the role of emerging tracing frameworks (Kprobes,
DTrace etc.) in enforcing operating system security without the reliance on a full-
blown virtual machine just for the purposes of such policing. We first build a novel
rootkit prototype that uses pattern-searching techniques to hijack hooks embedded
in dynamically allocated memory, which we present as a showcase of emerging attack
techniques. We then build an intrusion detection system — autoscopy, atop kprobes,
that detects anomalous control flow patterns typically exhibited by rootkits within a
running kernel. Furthermore, to validate our approach, we show that we were able to
successfully detect 15 existing Linux rootkits. We also conduct performance analy-
ses, which show the overhead of our system to range from 2% to 5% on a wide range
of standard benchmarks. Thus by leveraging tracing frameworks within operating
systems, we show that it is possible to introduce real-world security in devices where
performance and resource constraints are tantamount to security considerations.
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In this thesis, we focus on the problem of mitigating the proliferation of kernel-
based rootkits within operating systems. We do this by leveraging modern tracing
frameworks within the OS itself. This enables us to reliably and efficiently monitor
required state and examine the system for anomalies using OS-provided “triggers”
or probes. Our approach of detecting anomalies focuses on identifying generic kernel
control flow paths and then dynamically evaluating them at runtime to detect the
presence of rootkits. As we show, this approach has both the flexibility of operating
within harsh performance constraints, and is also extensive enough to cover most
working areas of a kernel.
Charlie Miller, the principal security analyst for Independent Security Evaluators
in a recent email exchange [9] with the British website The Register notes: “The gap
between a script kiddie and a hacker just got a little smaller.” He was referring to
Immunity Sec’s latest educational offering: an x86 “debug register” rootkit dubbed
DR [3] that ostensibly blurred the already receding divide between sophomoric “script
kiddies” (relegated to the superficial tasks of executing conveniently coded scripts
and tools that accomplish the necessary goals, while barely understanding their own
actions or consequences) and established hackers. The effects of this diminishing gap
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have already hit us — a seemingly unstoppable, constantly evolving force of malware
that threatens every corner of our lives, arising from the pervasiveness of computers
within our homes, offices, governments and mobile environments. Each passing week
brings with it reports of malware attacks across the Internet, corporate environments,
educational institutions and even cellular phones, these events unmistakably providing
a stark analogue to our world’s daily corpus of front-page calamities.
These attacks are real, they topple our economies, our industries, our politics, and
our privately-held lives, and as always, there exist guards, defenses, counter measures
and prevention policies against such impending threats at every level — but their
reliability remains a dominant question. Do these measures protect us from every
possible threat? The answer is almost never in the affirmative, the reason being that
preventing unknown forms of attack is justifiably hard, perhaps impossible. Software
flaws arise out of the manufacturing (i.e. software development) process itself instead
of the system acquiring such defects through repeated use, and detecting these crevices
is itself a challenge, let alone plugging them with some metaphorical “duct-tape”.
Malware, on the other hand, has been progressing rapidly both in terms of techno-
logical innovations (packers, VM/Debugger detection, “blue pill” escape techniques
etc.) and deployment strategies (botnets, covert network and storage channels, and so
on). Whole segments of the software industry have now cropped up dedicated to the
task of preventing or at least detecting the spread of malicious code across the net-
work. While this is certainly an admirable endeavor, a large portion of anti-malware
techniques in popular deployment today are enervated through their signature-based
approaches, which build identifiable software signatures out of known attacks in or-
der to detect or prevent their actions. This is largely a defeatist attitude since our
defenders are now always a step behind the seemingly impervious attackers. Deploy-
ing systems that do not rely on these signature calculations, but rather attempt to
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characterize the behavior of normal or malicious code and use this behavior to iden-
tify malware, remains a challenging task due to the performance burden imposed by
these systems, and their possibility of reporting a significant number of false posi-
tives/negatives.
While the term “malware” is pejoratively used to refer to a variety of malicious
software — worms, viruses, rootkits, trojans, time-bombs etc., an attacker typically
staggers his infiltration of the target [41] using just a subset of these avatars, much
like ancient battlefield tactics that staged their armies with the swordsmen in front,
archers in the middle and catapults forming the rear. A typical staged malware attack
would involve the following stages:
1. Penetration: This phase involves exploiting the target through buffer over-
flows, SQL injection, format string vulnerabilities etc.
2. Installation: The malware then installs the necessary files or devices, and sets
up the malware environment.
3. Cloaking: Malware components are then cloaked within the operating system
and its environment.
4. Diffusion: Finally, the malware spreads across communicable machines within
the target network and/or leaks information as desired by the malware author.
Rootkits are a class of malware that are responsible for camouflaging portions of the
malware within the target environment while retaining illusions of normalcy to an
external observer. The term rootkit arises out of the keywords “root,” referring to
the highest privilege of access on a Unix machine, and “kit”, a collection of collabo-
rative programs meant for gaining and retaining root privilege on remote hosts. The
threat model of rootkits is significantly different from the threat models of say, viruses,
worms or trojans. While the latter category of malware are primarily concerned with
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exploiting vulnerabilities in Internet-facing services or with rapid diffusion across the
network, rootkits take these exploits for granted. They presume that the vulnerabil-
ities (if any) have already been exploited in a previous leg of malware deployment,
and as such the attacker now has deifying root privileges on the remote system.
Still, the attacker’s job is only half done — his priorities now shift from infiltration
to covertness — how to effectively and efficiently hide the malware and its activities
from the remote user, system administrator, and intrusion detection agents. This is
at least as important an activity as the “breaking-in” process, because any triggered
alert would presumably cut off the attacker and cease his advances. The purposes of a
rootkit are not just to camouflage its activities, but to also ensure persistence across
reboots, and might further include creation of covert channels for communication
with a remote entity. Given these diverse functionalities, rootkits have evolved over
the past decade to embed themselves ever deeper into the entrails of the operating
system in order to evade detection. Considering the behemoths that are modern
operating systems, it should then come as no surprise that such rootkits have been
vastly successful in their evasive tactics.
Broadly, rootkits can be divided into two categories:
1. User-level rootkits: These rootkits are essentially just user-space binaries
or libraries mimicking the functionalities and visibility patterns of normal pro-
grams. They replace the standard application binaries and libraries, and some-
times even configuration files, in order to assist cloaking of malware. Examples
include illicit replacement binaries for ls, ps, tcpdump, ifconfig etc., the
focus mostly being user-level monitoring and reporting facilities, since these are
typically used by system administrators to monitor the state of the system.
On the brighter side, detecting user-level rootkits is mostly a solved problem,
with filesystem monitoring solutions such as Tripwire [10] and AIDE [1] able
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to detect a large percentage of these rootkits. These systems usually build and
maintain regular checksums (usually cryptographic hashes) of the filesystem and
install event-handling facilities in order to monitor and validate changes, along
with policies that dictate the allowed types and levels of accesses. Finally,
as a counter-attack against these defensive measures, rootkit authors started
progressing into the kernel space with rootkits that install themselves into the
operating system itself rather than its environment.
2. Kernel-level rootkits: These rootkits are more intricate and evolving than
their user-space counterparts. With techniques ranging from näıve redirection
of system-calls and altering interrupt handlers to modifying scheduler lists and
VFS redirection, kernel rootkits are gaining tremendous momentum as rootkit
authors aspire to sustain their attacks and elude detection even from paranoid
system adminstrators. On Unix systems, there exist multiple avenues of attack,
from malicious kernel module insertion to overwriting raw memory via /dev/mem
and /dev/kmem interfaces, while Windows rootkits exploit a technique known as
Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM) to seize control over critical kernel
objects and modify them to suit their purposes. In this thesis, we focus only on
Linux rootkits, but the underlying techniques remain universal and hence can
be utilized for similar detection mechanisms in other operating system kernels
such as Solaris, BSD, Windows etc.
While not yet as popular as user or kernel rootkits, a recent breed of rootkits
termed hypervisor rootkits [44] threatens to cause greater damage and provide a
higher guarantee of covertness by installing themselves below the operating system
(in the traditional system stack), thus acting as a service-provider for the OS itself
instead of being a consumer of OS services. While the implication here is that such
rootkits would go virtually undetected by any kind of sophisticated detection system
running within the virtual machine, the rootkits are also expected to be faithful to
5
the underlying hardware, with dedicated duplication of hardware being their primary
criterion for survival. However, such replication is believed to be hard and error-
prone [23] primarily due to the various anomalies and discrepancies that can be caught
at the level of CPU, MMU, TLB, timer chips etc. This is troublesome for the rootkit
since it has to not only duplicate the functionalities of the hardware, but also all its
faults and anomalies, just to avoid detection from the adversary running within a
virtual machine.
There exist other criteria through which rootkits are categorized. Rutkowska
presents a Malware Taxonomy [43] consisting of four classes of malware ranging from
Type 0 to Type III. Type 0 malware are applications that are harmful to the system
but do not subvert the OS interfaces in any way. As such, they cause damage while
working within the confines of the system boundaries. Since technically there is no
violation of OS interfaces, detection of such “malware” is futile. A typical example of
Type 0 malware is a program that deletes all files on disk, or corrupts only audio and
video files. Type I malware modifies static environment variables such as the system
call table, standard system binaries and libraries, kernel code regions etc. Type II
malware advances the modification technique to dynamic regions of the kernel mem-
ory including function pointers, data structures etc. Finally, the impending Type III
malware are hypervisor rootkits that are present underneath the operating system or
system BIOS.
Another division of rootkits is based on the specific techniques that kernel rootkits
employ to accomplish the necessary “hiding” goals. The Baliga et. al classifica-
tion [15] categorizes kernel rootkits as:
1. Control Hijacking: These rootkits subvert the kernel control flow without
ever returning control towards its original intended path.
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2. Control Interception: Such rootkits temporarily divert kernel control flow,
while still maintaining the original flow. Typically, some tampering of the kernel
state occurs when the flow is diverted.
3. Control Tapping: These rootkits are essentially the same as Control Inter-
ception rootkits, but the kernel state is untampered when the control flow is
diverted.
4. Data Value Manipulation: These are kernel rootkits that tamper only with
the kernel state through modification of data members or variables, without
intervening with the control flow.
5. Inconsistent Data Structures: Such rootkits cause inconsistency among
data structures (usually linked lists) in order to disrupt the kernel’s reporting
mechanisms.
In this thesis, our focus is only on Type II rootkits that employ Control Interception
and Control Tapping techniques, since these by far comprise the majority of rootkits
found in deployment today.
We now give the motivation behind developing autoscopy in Chapter 2, and then
give some background of the various tools and techniques involved in Chapter 3.
Chapter 4 gives an overview of our requirements and contributions, while Chapter 5
describes the implementation of our pattern-searching rootkit. Chapter 6 gives a de-
tailed design of our system, and Chapter 7 shows how we implemented autoscopy and
the various tradeoffs involved. Chapter 8 describes our evaluation criteria, details our
benchmarking results and also enumerates the various threats to autoscopy. Finally,
Chapter 9 highlights some of the related work in this area, and we conclude in Chap-





As we explain in Chapter 3, intrusion detection systems (IDSes) are frequently clas-
sified as either signature-based or anomaly-based systems, the latter sacrificing speed
for better detection capabilities. However, the performance impact of anomaly IDSes
is frequently ignored or underestimated, which limits their feasibility of deployment
to only high-end server machines with multi-core processors and several gigabytes of
RAM. But the ubiquitousness of light-weight systems with feeble processing power
and just a few hundreds of megabytes of RAM, executing off flash chips, is undeniable
— mobile phones, PDAs, biometric sensors, SCADA RTUs, barcode scanners, home
routers, etc. Security in these devices has largely been ignored, both for technical and
economic reasons, as evidenced in the recent work done by our colleagues in analyzing
networked set-top boxes widely deployed across campus [13].
Existing IDSes rely on the sophistication of virtual machine (VM) technology to
shield themselves from malicious code, and as such necessitate the presence of a
virtual machine monitor (VMM) appropriated for these purposes. In addition to
the extra execution code that VMMs confer on the running hardware, guest system
performance is limited to a fraction of its original. According to VMware’s report,
the average performance hit for hardware-assisted fully virtualized guests was about
8
6% for Vmware and 15% for Xen 3.0.3. We request the reader to consult Vmware’s
report [46] for detailed analyses on the latency delays for both these hypervisors.
In the embedded domain, it would be unpropitious to deploy systems built on top
of VMMs because of limited resources, performance constraints and real-time require-
ments, specifically within the US Power Grid infrastructure. Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems in the Power Grid and elsewhere are known for
their negligible and antiquated security mechanisms on millions of devices strewn
across the country today. When implementing add-on security mechanisms for these
devices, one should consider the elongated lifetime of these systems, and accordingly
consider both upgrade flexibility and system overheads, wherever applicable. The
security agency Riptech (now a part of Symantec) reports a lack of real-time mon-
itoring on SCADA systems [40] due to the incapability of these systems to handle
large amounts of data without significantly affecting system performance. We are
thus motivated to introduce real-world security in these devices where performance
and resource constraints are tantamount to security considerations.
Finally, in terms of coverage, kernel-level intrusion detection needs to be far more
exacting and thorough than detection systems at the application-level. On the other
hand, performance overheads in the latter are only constrained to the application of
choice, whereas any overhead suffered at the kernel impacts system-wide performance,
across both processor-bound and I/O-bound paths. These seemingly irreconcilable
constraints to be both exhaustive and efficient drive us to implement a detection
system that is comparable to the speed of signature-based IDSes while retaining the




In this chapter, we give a brief overview of the technologies, tools and techniques used
to implement our system.
3.1 Intrusion Detection
As with rootkits, intrusion detectors can also be classified on different criteria. Here
we focus only on the classification based on the type of detection mechanism.
1. Signature-based: These detectors proceed by first conducting a source-level
or object-level analysis of the malware sample and deriving a set of signatures
that uniquely identify the malware. These signatures are then distributed and
fed into the detection system that can now detect this malware. Signature-
based IDSes are fast since the system only needs to compute and verify against
a finite set of signatures. However, even slight variants of the analyzed mal-
ware samples can fool the IDS altogether. Also in the specific case of rootkit
detectors, signature-based methods [36] [42] [2] [8] [33] must be run manually
(or periodically). Such detectors do not provide continuous inline monitoring
of the host system.
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2. Anomaly-based: Anomaly-based IDSes attempt to characterize the normal
working behavior of the client application or system, and use this character-
istic as the ground truth against which all future measurements are classified.
These systems work by observing either behavior patterns of processes over
time [22] [26] or call stack monitoring [21] or other patterns of established be-
havior. Any deviation from the normal order would indicate aberrant behavior
and hence a high likelihood of an intrusion. Such systems usually suffer from
slow learning times, detection latencies and false positives. In the subdomain of
rootkit detection, anomaly detectors [45] [25] employ virtual machine monitors
(VMM) to enforce containment and isolation properties on the guest machine.
3.2 Loadable Kernel Modules
Loadable Kernel Modules (abbreviated as LKMs) are modules that can be dynamically
inserted and removed from the core kernel without affecting other system services.
They provide OS extensibility in monolithic kernels, and are designed by borrowing
ideas from traditional micro-kernel models. Linux’s kmod driver provides load-on-
demand functionalities to the kernel modules residing on disk, so that an LKM is
injected into the kernel only if its functionalities are required. In other cases, LKMs
passively reside on disk. Interfaces in the kernel are exported to the LKMs for module
code to hook into the kernel. However, even though inserting LKMs require root




As system administrators started to grapple with increasing program complexity,
heisenbugs 1, and seemingly impenetrable operating systems that offered sparse de-
bugging support, OS engineers came to terms with the growing need for systems that
offered monitoring, tracing, and debugging facilities across the system as a whole in-
stead of focusing on just individual applications. Building frameworks to understand
system performance and locate bottleneck and throttling conditions became of utmost
importance, and Sun responded in January, 2005 with its release of DTrace [18]. With
its low-latency observation mechanisms that could be run on actual deployed systems
and inflicting no overhead when offline, DTrace was an instant hit with administrators
everywhere.






Figure 3.1: Control flow within the Kprobes framework (duplicated from [32])
Linux responded with Kprobes [32], developed by IBM researchers and intro-
duced in kernel version 2.6.9 that allowed the execution of arbitrary handler code
at any point during the kernel’s execution. Since probe handlers are written within
1hard-to-track bugs, whose behavior changes when observed
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LKMs, one typically needs root privileges in order to use this facility. Kprobes is also
extremely useful for debugging specific parts of the kernel without the need for tra-
ditional recompile/reboot/test cycles, thus saving development costs and time. Fur-
thermore, kprobes provides better tracing support for the kernel, facilitating deeper
transparency and performance evaluations. Recently, a project called SystemTap [37]
was undertaken whose current members include RedHat, IBM, Intel and Hitachi. The
aims of the project are to provide a usable abstraction framework atop Kprobes and
make the design palatable for users possessing little programming knowledge.
Since our system uses Kprobes for installing probe points across the kernel, it would
behoove us to take a deeper look at how Kprobes is internally implemented. Kprobes
provides three handlers for the user to implement (all of which are optional) for his
choice of instruction in kernel memory. Kprobes copies the instruction at the address
indicated, and installs a breakpoint2. When the breakpoint is hit, the trap handler
verifies if a probe was inserted at that instruction. If so, the trap handler transfers
control to Kprobes, which then calls the pre-handler (if registered). The copy of the
original instruction is then executed. If the user had installed a post-handler, this
function is then called. Finally, normal control resumes from where the trap was
initiated. If the OS encounters a fault during any of these processes, a user-specified
fault handler is called which is useful mainly for diagnostic purposes. Figure 3.1 is a
succint visual representation of the above verbiage.
3.4 Intel x86 assembly calls
Function calls on x86 can be either direct or indirect — a direct function call is
one where the target function is known (and resolved) during compilation or linking
time. On the other hand, an indirect function call is one whose call target cannot
2On x86 systems, the opcode of a breakpoint instruction is 0xCC
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be determined at compilation or even program linking time, but can only be resolved
at runtime by either the operating system, the system dynamic linker, or sometimes
the application’s own linker. Hence the address of the target (or callee function)
is not known until runtime, when the call is actually decoded and executed by the
processor. An assembly CALL instruction implements a typical C function call on the
x86 architecture. The x86 instruction set provides assembly-level counterparts to the
high-level direct and indirect function calls present in C.
The operands of the CALL instruction encode the call target (or callee function). In
the case of a direct function call, the operand is a fixed value that is the address of the
target function. This operand is inserted either during the compilation, static linking,
or dynamic linking phases. When calling a function through a pointer (indirect call),
there are two ways in which the call can be accomplished in assembly:
1. Memory-indirect: The operand of the CALL is a memory address. When the
CALL instruction is executed, the contents of that address are first fetched, then
treated as the address of the target function, and finally the call is performed.
Examples of such calls are:
call *(%eax)
call *0x4(%eax)
2. Register-indirect: The operand of the CALL is the index of a suitable register.
The address of the callee function is loaded into this register just before the
CALL instruction. The CALL subsequently picks this address from the register




















App 1 App 2
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Figure 3.2: System architecture with respect to LKM and kmem interfaces. App3 is a
userspace application that uses /dev/kmem to access raw system memory.
The /dev/kmem driver is used to directly access kernel memory from userspace.
This interface is sometimes used to apply bug-fixes or dynamically patch the kernel
without incurring the overhead of a system reboot. Also, user-space drivers usually
access device memory through either the mem or kmem interfaces. Disabling these
interfaces could either break backward compatibility, or necessitate workarounds for
applications currently using them. That being said, the kmem and LKM interfaces
are the two most widely abused boundaries in the Linux kernel, with rootkits rou-
tinely exploiting them for entry into the kernel. In fact, there have been cases of
administrators disabling loadable modules in the kernel to completely avoid rootkit
attacks. But this still admits /dev/kmem rootkits. There do exist slight differences in
rootkits deployed through these two interfaces. kmem rootkits are arguably weaker
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than LKM rootkits, mostly due to the fact that the rootkit now has to guess more
often, since kernel-exported interfaces are not available. But kmem rootkits can rely
on the driver always being available while in the case of LKM rootkits there is the
possibility that the administrator might have crippled the interface. There have also
been efforts to disable3 the kmem interface altogether — but on the 2.6.19.7 kernel
we tested on, which was running Ubuntu 7.04, /dev/kmem could still be mmapped4.
We note that kmem and LKM are just interfaces to access the kernel, and a kernel
vulnerability is equally capable of providing such accesses, though its convenience is
arguable. Figure 3.2 depicts the system architecture with respect to LKMs and the
kmem interface.
3http://kerneltrap.org/mailarchive/linux-kernel/2008/2/11/809424
4This is also the case with later versions of the kernel
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Chapter 4
Approaching the Problem of
Detecting Rootkits
4.1 Overview
We present a radically different approach to rootkit detection that allows us to lever-
age existing tracing frameworks in modern operating systems and obviate the need
for an external VMM. This also has the advantage of reducing system overhead since
we are essentially protecting the OS from within itself, instead of delegating the im-
plementation to an additional VM layer. But since we are attempting to protect
ring 0 code from within ring 0, there is no guarantee that our system is completely
shielded from malware code. As such, we advise the use of other technologies such as
W⊕X/NX [7], Copilot [35] to ensure static text integrity.
Control flow anomaly detection techniques have been used before [34] to detect
kernel rootkits, but these approaches use static code analysis techniques (by tracking
global kernel variables) to determine control flow graphs, and a VMM at runtime to
verify the control paths. But static analysis techniques are incapable of detecting
hooks present in dynamically allocated memory. Also, performing such detection by
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frequently interrupting the guest control flow (i) first needs to address the VM seman-
tic gap [20], (ii) can cause performance issues due to rapid context-switching between
the host and the guest and, (iii) might still allow ephemeral rootkits to persist on
the monitored guest. Basically, we intend to operate where more traditional meth-
ods of interposition and program analysis tend to be either insufficient, expensive,
or both. Our self-monitoring system, autoscopy, attempts to learn a model of the
kernel’s function pointers using kprobes, and classify all future flows in accordance to
the learned model.
To understand how our system works, we first give a brief explanation of how
existing rootkits hijack kernel function pointers (analogously hooks or pointer hooks)
in order to alter control flow. Control-flow altering rootkits comprise by far the
majority of rootkits deployed today. Recall from Chaper 1 that the raison d’etre for
rootkits is to expertly camouflage hostile behavior without raising the suspicions of
the system administrator or host IDSes. In order to achieve this, the system should
seem to be functioning as normal even though it may not actually be. To illustrate,
if one is hijacking hooks at the vfs layer, then all reads/writes/stats to files and
directories other than the one the rootkit is interfering with, should not be tampered
or inhibited in any way. Otherwise, an alert system admin or monitoring IDS might
detect changes in the filesystem that should not have manifested in the first place.
Interfering with control flow is possibly one of the easiest ways a rootkit can inject
itself into a working kernel without significantly altering system state. To conduct a
typical injection attack, the rootkit author first identifies the kernel components to
carry out the deception — the network stack, filesystem layer, scheduler routines etc.
Identifying the target gives the attacker a set of possible hooks to work with. These
hooks may be present either in static or dynamic memory, either within the core







 if (orig_readdir)                                                                                                                                                                                    
    *orig_readdir = filep->f_op->readdir;                                                                                                                                                              
 filep->f_op->readdir = new_readdir; 
Figure 4.1: Interposing kernel control flow by a rootkit through hook hijacking.
that usually give him greater flexibility and control to conduct the attack, after which
the rootkit is coded to interpose itself using these hooks. Figure 4.1 is an illustration
of how this works. The caller and callee blocks signify their respective functions.
The caller calls the callee using a function pointer (hook). By overwriting this hook
to point to the its own function, a rootkit performs a proverbial man-in-the-middle
attack. Note that the rootkit still tranfers control to the original callee function,
since it wishes to retain the services provided by this layer, while still carrying out
its designated tasks.
Thus rootkits hijack kernel hooks, but eventually call the kernel’s native functions
to do the actual work (thereby providing the illusion of uninterrupted service). An
unreliable or unavailable service increases the risk of discovery — precisely the event
that rootkit authors strive to avoid. This tendency also makes good software en-
gineering sense because rootkit authors, like regular software engineers, are under
pressure to reuse specialized known-to-work code.
To understand and further motivate the case for our intrusion detection system that
is capable of detecting advanced rootkits, we first set out developing a rootkit proto-
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type of our own that does not conform to existing methods of attack (eg: hijacking
hooks in static memory regions, or using System.map/kallsyms/LKM interface to
resolve symbols). While a majority of rootkits available for Linux hijack only system-
calls (with exceptions like adore-ng), we wish to hijack hooks at a layer much below
that of a functioning system-call interface, preferably somewhere near the device-
driver structures that are omnipresent within the kernel. Hijacking hooks deep down
in the bowels of operating systems can be relatively hard to detect, primarily because
it is difficult to track down all hooks used by low-level kernel code (especially if the
hooks are dynamically allocated), and also monitoring the OS in time-critical sections
can be a challenging task.
We further constrain ourselves to working from within the “weaker” /dev/kmem
interface instead of using LKMs. One reason for doing this is to show that the
kmem (and equivalently, the mem) interface is just as enabling a platform for rootkit
injections as the LKM interface is. However, we need to adapt ourselves to the lack of
symbol resolution and limited visibility when working through kmem, and we come up
with a pattern-searching technique that allows us to leverage known patterns within
kernel structures to identify the hooks, which we then hijack.
4.2 Our Requirements
To better understand the space in which our system lies, and effectively outline our
contributions, we come up with a set of requirements that autoscopy must satisfy.
These are described below:
1. We aim to dynamically discover the kernel hooks to protect, by querying running
system state as opposed to static tools or verification processes. This allows
autoscopy to be more exhaustive and thorough than existing IDSes. We should
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also not consider the source code of the operating system, which might not be
available to us in all cases.
2. Autoscopy needs to perform in-place or synchronous intrusion detection, i.e. to
line up our detector with the control flow so we do not open a time-slot during
which one can deploy an ephemeral rootkit. Almost all signature-based systems
and a few anomaly-based systems existing today are unable to detect transient
rootkits that are installed and removed within a short period. Autoscopy needs
to be able to detect even these kinds of rootkits.
3. We aim to not use virtual machines, tainting or other high-cost observation
techniques.
4. Autoscopy also needs to be performance-aware and practical in deployment.
We accomplish this using existing kernel frameworks such as kprobes. While
performance awareness might mean adapting the detection system itself to cope
with varying system performance, for example by reducing the number of hooks
that are monitored, we do not consider it in this thesis. Instead, we aim for low
performance overheads at all times.
5. We need to support detection both when the rootkit is already present on the
system when autoscopy is deployed, or when the rootkit is installed at some
later point in time.
4.3 Contributions of Autoscopy
Our contributions in this work both involve newer rootkit development techniques
that require minimal context information and no symbol resolution, and the im-
plementation and evaluation of a mature intrusion detection system that leverages
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existing OS frameworks to waylay and validate kernel control paths. The primary
contributions of our work are as follows:
1. Development of a pattern-matching rootkit technique – Existing rootk-
its implemented as kernel modules use kernel support for symbol resolution
in order to hijack hooks. kmem rootkits on the other hand require hardcoded
addresses, or read symbols off /proc/kallsyms or the local System.map in or-
der to resolve them — neither approaches being feasible for deployment in the
real world. We propose a technique that uses basic semantic pattern-matching
expressions to identify hooks in memory using just a minimal specification of
the memory regions surrounding the hooks, that we (as an attacker) would be
interested in.
2. An anomaly-based system for detecting control-flow hijacking ker-
nel rootkits – Our detection system is aimed at providing continuous inline
protection for kernel hooks whose locations are initially learned by exercising
the kernel. Our detection system works either in the presence of an already
installed rootkit, or if a rootkit is installed at a later point in time. We use
the kernel’s tracing framework to insert probes along control flow paths, dis-
assemble the appropriate x86 instructions on the fly, construct function-level
control-flow graphs (CFGs), and finally determine the validity of the control
flow. Appropriate alarms and notices are raised in case a rootkit is detected
within the system.
3. A detection architecture with low performance impact – Our system
does not rely on static analysis, VMMs, tainted information flow, or other high-
cost observation mechanisms. Instead we take advantage of the recent surge in
OS-embedded tracing technologies to implement an observation layer on top.
As such, we hope to significantly reduce performance overhead and work within
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strict resource constraints. In our experiments, autoscopy imposes an overhead
ranging from 2% to 5%.
4.4 Caveats of our Approach
Our system is meant to detect a rootkit’s presence, detecting deviations in control
flow and providing a framework where one can analyze the system state and repair the
corruption. We do not seek to understand the high-level behavior (e.g., the protocol
of its control channel, or the files it spies upon) of an installed rootkit [29]. Since we
work at the same privilege level as potential malicious code, complete isolation is not
a privilege we can afford. As such, we require a static integrity monitor [35] [7] to
enforce kernel and module text integrity from the most basic rootkits that attempt
to alter kernel code.
Without such a system or other kernel text integrity monitor in place, there is a
possibility that our system can be subverted. We do not see this assumption as a
limitation; rather, our system is aimed at detecting and defeating the more advanced
threats that have evolved (and were in response to systems like CoPilot) to not rely
on modifying kernel text. In addition, we do not currently deal with the case where
a rootkit can copy the hooked function and then execute it (we note that no existing
rootkits do this, but it still is a possibility). This scenario can be handled by enabling
the processor’s NX bit, which prevents execution from any memory page that has
been written. We elaborate on the threats to autoscopy and our mitigation strategies
in Section 8.6.
We emphasize that, by themselves, static integrity enforcement techniques cannot
detect sophisticated rootkits that employ some form of dynamic hook modification or
control-flow redirection. We see these tools as building blocks to help build systems
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such as autoscopy that are directed towards more devious rootkits than the ones that
just modify static text or data.
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Chapter 5
A Network Driver Rootkit
We undertake the development of a rootkit prototype that advances the field of ex-
isting offensive techniques by integrating basic pattern-searching to alleviate the re-
quirement for kernel symbol resolution. As explained in Chapter 3, rootkits can be
installed into the operating system through either the LKM interface or the mem and
kmem interfaces. In terms of generated object code, Linux kernel modules are just
ELF (Executable and Linking format) objects [5], with dynamic relocation sections
indicating the regions that require symbol resolution. The kernel’s module insertion
code maps the target module into memory and resolves the symbols with their appro-
priate locations. However, for symbol resolution to succeed in this way, the symbol
must first be “exported” from the kernel during compilation time, usually through an
identifier such as EXPORT SYMBOL or EXPORT SYMBOL GPL, which are kernel
macros.
Rootkits deployed through the mem and kmem interfaces have no such luxury; and
if /proc/kallsyms and System.map are absent on the target system, then no symbol
resolution is possible. To counter this limitation, certain rootkits hardcode the ad-
dresses of the system-call table or target hook, but this makes the rootkit unportable
and impractical for mass deployment. Also, hijacking of dynamically allocated hooks
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is hard. Other rootkits use either the IDT handler routines (eg: enyelkm) or use
näıve search techniques to locate the system call table (eg: override). Both tech-
niques only try to identify the system call table, and hijacking hooks at this layer is
relatively trivial to detect because of the static nature of the syscall table.
We first see how rootkits do not even need LKM functionality in order to subvert
the system. The administrator of a system can choose to disable the loadable module
interface, in which case many of the attacks through this interface are defeated. But
the /dev/kmem interface that allows one to read and write into kernel memory is still
a dangerous foothold for integrating malicious code into the kernel. Here the lack
of kernel-exported interfaces means that a rootkit deployed through the kmem driver
can no longer be agnostic about where in memory the structure actually resides and
has to resort to searching for this structure.
What we first propose is to search for relevant structures in kernel memory using
only a small amount of semantic information. Our aim is to make this process generic
enough to work on multiple kernel versions and across varying architectures. Exam-
ples of such semantic information are the MAC address of the target network driver,
the major and minor numbers of the character or block driver, address range patterns
in the binary-format structure etc. However, näıvely searching for such patterns leads
to a large number of positive matches, because the search query is small enough to
warrant such hits.
To limit the query results within acceptable bounds, we require some form of spec-
ification that describes the data in close proximity to the desired address. The obser-
vation that we leverage in writing our rootkit relates to the general layout of kernel
data structures in memory. Linked lists, and in particular doubly-linked lists (D-LL),
constitute the backbone of a majority of kernel data structures. The Linux kernel
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provides a framework for efficiently embedding these lists into any given structure.
This is how most structures are chained together. Examples of such lists are lists of
character devices and block devices, lists of network devices, lists of processes and
LKMs, a scheduler list of processes, a list of binary-format handlers, lists of file-
systems, inodes, dnodes, timer lists and so on. In order to support OS extensibility
and modularity, these structures have function pointers embedded within them that
the necessary modules modify to point to their own functions. Thus, doubly-linked
lists are an excellent distinguisher for hooks that lie within such structures. We note
that these hooks are just a subset of function pointer hooks that are vulnerable to
rootkits.
The aim of our rootkit is to hijack the network driver’s send function, for a device
of our choice. This gives us total control over all packets sent into the network, and
is particularly dangerous since the packets we modify cannot be revealed by a local
sniffer on the host such as tcpdump, ethereal etc. Our semantic specification consists
of just the MAC address of the network card. We then search for the MAC string
over the entire kernel memory, which might potentially result in a large number of
matches (when we performed this experiment, we got about 93 matches). But since
we know that all network devices are chained together, we narrow down the search
results by pattern-searching for doubly-linked lists within the vicinity of the previous
hits (the range of the vicinity is approximated by the size of the kernel’s net device
structure). The pattern for these lists is a familiar one: the next and previous pointers
should point to the appropriate nodes in the list, and the previous and next pointers
of adjacent nodes should be identical. In case of a circular list, the last node should
point back to the first, otherwise should contain a null next pointer. If all these
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Figure 5.1: Pattern-searching in our rootkit. The numbers indicate the order of
search: from (1) the MAC address to (2) D-LL verification to (3) the network
driver’s transmit hook.
If the final set of matches obtained are not within acceptable boundaries, then
we would need to append a stronger specification. In our case, this could be the
possible range of values at addresses close to the match (for example the MTU value,
interface name etc). Finally, we determine the send function-pointer by a fixed offset
from the linked-list as determined from the net device structure. We also verify
that the pointer points to a valid function prelude and then modify it to point to our
rootkit function, which modifies the packets as necessary, finally calling the original
send function to deliver the packets into the network. The pattern-searching process
of this rootkit is shown in Figure 5.1
What this implementation aims to show is that rootkits can completely bypass
standard kernel interfaces and instead rely on just the kernel memory to discover
their desired hooks, thus making them possibly even more difficult to detect. We
stress that these hooks live at unpredictable memory locations and so their values




The Design of Autoscopy
6.1 Overview
Autoscopy is designed to operate in two phases. An initial learning phase attempts
to characterize the hooks used within the kernel by identifying the dynamic caller-
callee function context (i.e. the function addresses themselves) in which the hooks are
used. Since this phase is decoupled from the succeeding detection phase, we could
implement our learning using a VMM (and we have experimented with this using
QEMU), but in order to provide a homogenous development platform and to better
reuse code across both phases, we resorted to kprobes as our final implementation
framework. Although not strictly necessary for our detection, we also “beautify”
the results in order to facilitate tabulation of our results and possibly aid a manual
analysis of hook behavior. The hooks learned through this process form the input for
our detection phase.
The detection phase uses kprobes as the primary platform for conducting analyses,
gathers the previously learned hooks, implements a rigorous detection mechanism
that ensures in-line flow integrity, accounts for variable module addresses, and is also
capable of detecting an already-present rootkit (since we scan for anomalies instead
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of signatures). Finally, we also conduct an evaluation of our system and benchmark
it against a wide range of standard benchmarks.
6.2 Revealing Kernel Hooks (Learning Phase)
Having established that rootkits consistently hijack hooks within the kernel, our ap-
proach to detecting rootkits is to first focus on enumerating these hooks that are
frequently abused by malware. SBCFI [34] relies on a similar technique, although
their technique of discovering hooks is to traverse the kernel source code, mark all
global variables that lead to function pointers, and at runtime, traverse these vari-
ables to identify the hooks. This approach works, but the limitation imposed by
static code analysis along with the VMM implementation prohibits SBCFI from per-
forming inline detection thus requiring the system to be run at frequent intervals.
Moreover, hooks that are not necessarily reachable from global variables would go
unrevealed, and considering the C language’s loose type checking, some hooks might
be camouflaged as just void* pointers and completely evade source code analysis.
The broad task of revealing hooks within the kernel can be approached in a number
of ways. One could design a system working from the inside (the target that is being
analyzed), or from the outside (a monitoring environment such as a VMM). Even after
choosing a particular design, one has to contend with what kind of hooks to detect,
since hooks are spread across the entire breadth of the Linux kernel. For example,
Hookmap [47], an independent research project, chooses to focus only on hooks that
lie on the kernel control flow paths executed by a designated user space application.
Typically this application is some kind of a monitoring tool or intrusion-detection
system.
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We cast a wider net, and our system aims to identify as many hooks as possible in a
running Linux kernel. The obvious advantage of this approach is that we can expose
more hooks that might be compromised by kernel rootkits, even hooks that might not
lie on the control path of a monitoring application (examples of such hooks are the
ones present in asynchronous kernel threads or interrupt handlers). A disadvantage
of our approach arising due to the fact that we use no “filter” during our process
of capturing hooks, is that our approach might lead to an unmanageable number of
them and hence thwart manual inspection. We remedy this by providing a convincing
analysis that links the hooks we find with the functions that use them, and also link
them with the kernel source-code (when possible) to aid better inspection. We note
that this tabulation of hooks is just an intermediate glossy process to better illustrate
our findings and is not strictly necessary for our second phase.
Moreover, the system we build in this phase is not just meant to feed our particular
IDS, but other existing and future intrusion detection systems. We hope to fuel both
automatic and manual inspection of kernel hooks and as such, we cannot restrict
ourselves to only a subset of them (since an IDS should be capable of handling and
protecting hundreds, if not thousands of pointers). Our design leverages the kprobes
framework, which we use primarily for validating the hooks we examine, and collecting
the necessary information needed for further analysis.
We begin by first collecting plausible hooks from kernel memory. Any pointer into
the kernel code-space has the likelihood of being a hook, and we do not (yet) know
whether this is the case or not. Since pointers are word-aligned (and the word size on
a 32-bit machine is 4 bytes), we attempt to search the kernel memory in increments
of 4 bytes. For each word encountered, if its value is a valid text address, we insert a
probe at that address. Note that the probes are not inserted on the hooks themselves,
but rather on the functions that are called using these hooks. To enumerate memory
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addresses, we first give a brief description of how Linux handles virtual addresses.
The Linux kernel is statically mapped during bootup at virtual address 0xc0000000
+ 0x100000. The virtual-to-physical mapping is just a linear transformation from
this base address, i.e. virtual address 0xc0000000 corresponds to physical address
0x0. If the amount of physical memory installed on the system is above 896M, then by
default, the first 896M is statically mapped, and the rest is considered as highmem
region, which is dynamically allocated as necessary. In our case, the amount of
physical memory was 710M.
To search for function-pointer hooks, we only need to walk the kernel’s data section
and not its text, so we skip the initial text region (demarcated by the kernel symbols
stext and etext), align the start pointer on the next word boundary and traverse
the memory contiguously. Our search pertains only to the physical memory mapped
directly into the kernel and we do not attempt to traverse the kernel high memory.
We do not see this as a problem since embedded systems rarely have more than a
gigabyte of memory, and if needed, we can easily adapt autoscopy to traverse kernel
high memory areas. Our algorithm for traversing memory and filtering out this initial
estimate of hooks is shown below:
1: kdata start ← etext {adjusted to a word boundary}
2: kdata end ← kdata start + Size-of-physical-memory
3: for w = kdata start to kdata end do
4: v ← ∗w. {Dereference w}
5: if v is a valid address in the kernel text then
6: if ∗v is a valid function prelude then




10: w ← w + 4.
11: end for
A valid x86 function prelude consists of the following assembly statements:
push %ebp
mov %ebp, %esp
Since we built the kernel with frame pointers enabled, every function will have
this signature at the start. Hence a pointer is a function-pointer iff it points to a valid
prelude.
When the above algorithm ends, we would have at our disposal an initial estimate
of kernel/module functions that might be called using hooks. To filter out the false
reports, we need to actually verify that these functions were called using function
pointers, and to do that we use kprobes to insert our own handling routines when
any of these functions are called, and then determine the manner of the call.
For all the “potential” targets obtained through the above memory traversal algo-
rithm, we insert a probe at the indicated location. Note that at this point we have
thousands of probes sitting on potential targets. We still have to exercise the kernel
so that these probes are fired, and we can determine whether the targets were indeed
called using a hook. To fully exercise the kernel, we rely on the extensive Linux Test
Suite or LTP [6], which is a project started by SGI and currently being maintained
by IBM that consists of a wide range of test cases meant to validate every aspect of
the Linux kernel. A complete run of the test suite takes anywhere from 2-4 hours
depending on system load. This duration might be further amplified by the fact that
we have inserted a few thousand probes across the kernel.
Basically, the idea here is to hit as many of the probes as we can. Hence choosing
an appropriate suite (in our case, LTP) is paramount, since we want to exercise the
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kernel as much as possible in order to maximize our chances of hitting the probes.
Note that it might be possible to never hit some of the probes, since the corresponding
functions might never get called (such as those in unused drivers) or only get called
during system bootup.
We now turn our attention to the probe handlers. Since their task is to determine
indirect calls, we first retrieve the return address from the stack, and disassemble it
in reverse. The last instruction of the caller function has to be a CALL. Disassembling
this instruction reveals the type of call. If the call was direct, we skip it. Else, we have
successfully identified the hook’s caller/callee context, but the identity of the hook
itself remains elusive. To obtain the address of the hook, we diagnose the operands
of the indirect call as follows:
1. Memory-indirect CALL: Here the address of the hook is already present in
the operand. Since we’ve just disassembled the call instruction, we can obtain
the hook address quite easily.
2. Register-indirect CALL: In this type of a call, the operand only has an
index of some register. In order to obtain the hook address, we would need
to disassemble in reverse and look at the last point in code where this register
was written into from memory, which would give us the required hook address.
Traditional forward disassembly of code disassembles instructions starting from
the base address and moving upwards to higher memory locations, while reverse
disassembly typically needs to disassemble instructions at memory locations
that are lower than a base. But such reverse disassembly on x86 is never
an easy task, mostly due to the fact that there is no knowledge of where the
previous instruction begins or what its length is. This makes reverse disassembly
a clumsy and inaccurate process. But we still somehow need to know what the
previous instructions are.
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We get at them through traditional forward disassembly, starting the disassembly
from the point where the function begins, and constructing a control flow graph (CFG)
of the current function. We can do this because we know that every function has to
start with a prelude; so we first search back (from the return EIP) till the point
where we find a valid prelude, then disassemble forward, while creating a CFG of the
complete function.
push %ebp 
mov %ebp, %esp 
… 
call 0xc015c780 
test %eax, %eax 
mov %ebx, %eax 
je 0xc018e7d8 
mov %eax, [edx] 













































Figure 6.1: Steps undertaken by our system to find the hook address in case of
a register-indirect call.
After constructing the CFG, we locate the node in which the CALL lies, mark
the desired register that makes up the call, and search backwards from this node
for the instruction that writes into the required register. In case the CALL contains
multiple registers (such as base and indexed registers), we repeat this procedure for
each individual register. To search backwards in the CFG, we simply reverse the edges
of the graph and follow the paths. Within each node, we traverse its instructions in
reverse. After locating this instruction(s), we determine the address of the hook by
analyzing the contents of processor registers when this instruction(s) was executed by
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the kernel. The above process assumes that function text is organized as a sequence
of instructions laid out consecutively in memory, which is the case with most Unix
kernels. This technique is shown in Figure 6.1. Consider the following fictitious
example of a single node in the CFG to illustrate our analysis of a register-indirect
call:
1. mov ebx, 0xc0454f70
2. add edx, ecx
3. mov eax, [ebx+4]





The register-indirect call (using register eax) is at instruction 6, but just analyzing
the contents of this register gives us the target function (callee) address, and not the
hook address. Searching backwards within this node for the instruction that wrote
into eax lands us at position 3. After determining this, if we analyze the register
contents at that instruction, and add 4 to the value of ebx, this gives us the hook
address. Note that this example only illustrates how the search is conducted within
a node; if the desired instruction cannot be found in the same node, we traverse
backwards to the nodes leading up to the current one in the CFG, and repeat the
procedure shown here.
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6.3 Detecting the Hijacking of Hooks (Detection
Phase)
To implement an anomaly-based system, we first have to characterize the behavior
of a majority of existing rootkits that use pointer hooks. Recall that pointer hooks
are essentially function pointers that are present in the kernel’s data sections. The
addresses of these hooks can be either static or dynamic, depending on where the
hooks are located. We henceforth refer to the function that is called using a pointer
hook as a hook function. A rootkit hook function is a function that lies within a
rootkit, while a kernel hook function is one that lies within the kernel or in non-rootkit
LKMs. In his book on rootkits [27], Joseph Kong describes hooking as a programming
technique that employs handler functions to modify control flow. Typically, a hook
function will call the original function at some point in order to preserve the intended
behavior.
A hook function calling another hook function (diverting control away from the core
kernel) is exactly the kind of behavior we wish to detect. Since the hook functions in
both cases are called via indirect calls, and the arguments passed to these functions
are somewhat identical (we elaborate more in Chapter 7), we should be able to detect
such a scenario and report the presence of a rootkit. We insert probes on the final
list of callee functions identified in the learning phase, and when these probes are hit,
we scan for the possibility of the above attack vector. We also make the assumption
that the kernel text is unmodified by the rootkit — this is not a limiting factor of our
system since text modifications are easily detectable by existing systems [31] [42] [30],
and so is a dangerous avenue for any rootkit trying to avoid detection. Moreover,
having the entire region of kernel memory at its disposal, a rootkit can perform
subtler attacks than simply overwriting kernel text, which can be detected almost
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instantaneously by such detectors. Also, maintaining text integrity is an orthogonal
problem which we do not tackle here.
Our method works as follows. During the learning phase, if the hook function (or
callee function) is within the core kernel text, then we insert a probe on this function.
Else, if the hook function is within an LKM, then we first insert a probe on the caller’s
CALL instruction. When this probe is hit, we disassemble the call, obtain the address
of the callee, and insert a probe on it. After inserting probes this way, our system
now enters a passive state, where the actions are triggered only when these probes
are hit. Hence if a particular hook function is never called, then our system imposes
no overhead on it. These initial probe handlers (also called Type I probe handlers)
first determine whether the function was called through a pointer hook. To do this,
we repeat the same procedure as in the learning phase, i.e. look at the return address
on the stack, disassemble the last CALL instruction and verify that it is an indirect
call. In case of a direct call, we return. Note that we still need to repeat this step,
since the same function can be called both directly and indirectly from different parts
of the kernel.
Our next step is to check for the presence of a rootkit. Let h be a hook, and F be
the corresponding function we’ve inserted a probe on. We have two cases to handle:
1. When a rootkit is installed while autoscopy is functioning: In this case, the
rootkit would modify h to point to its own hook function F ′ and since the
original functionality must be unhindered, F ′ still calls F . The call chain now
looks like F ′ → A→ B → ...→ F , where A,B... might be intermediate rootkit
functions. Since our probe is on F , we look up the call stack from F , and for
each return EIP, disassemble the previous CALL and check if it is an indirect
one. If so, then we additionally verify the arguments passed to that function
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(in this case, F ′, since A,B, ... would be direct calls), with the arguments that
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Figure 6.2: Our Detection Process. Autoscopy inserts probes on hooks to determine if
control flow has been diverted to a new rootkit (a), or if control flow is returning from an
already-present rootkit (b). The dotted lines indicate how the probe handlers detect the
indirect calls. The numbering shows the order of control flow. In case (a), our probe resides
in the original callee. In case (b), our probes land within the rootkit itself.
2. When a rootkit is already present on the system: In this case, the function that
we put a probe on is the rootkit function itself. But we don’t know that yet.
The call-chain still looks like F ′ → A→ B → ...→ F , but the probe is now on
F ′. Since the probe is at the beginning of the function, we first disassemble F ′
in memory. Then we insert probes (also called Type II probes) on all functions
that F ′ calls (both directly and indirectly). When these probes are hit, we
repeat the same process i.e. disassemble the function and insert probes on all
function calls. If F ′ (or A,B, ...) makes a direct kernel function call, we need
not insert a probe on it since we assume the kernel text is unmodified. Hence
we insert probes only on indirect calls and on direct calls whose target is not
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within the core kernel.
We pass context information across all Type II probes, so that when they’re
“hit”, they look up their context to determine what to do. The context sup-
plied to direct function-call probes indicates the probe handler should continue
putting probes on functions underneath it, while the context for indirect call
probes indicates that the handler should check its arguments against those of
F ′, while also continue inserting probes if the function is not within the core
kernel.
So, in the above call-chain, the probe-handler for F ′ puts a probe on A, A’s
handler puts a probe on B, B’s handler puts a probe on F , and F ’s handler
checks its arguments against F ′ (since F is an indirect call from B), and detects
the rootkit. Figure 6.2 details this process.
All Type I and Type II probes are also cached so we do not keep inserting and
removing probes across these modules, which might diminish performance.
To insert probes on all calls within a function, we first construct a CFG of the function.
Briefly, a CFG consists of basic-blocks that are delimited only by jump or return
instructions. Each node in the CFG represents a contiguous sequence of instructions
that has a single jump or return instruction at the end. An edge exists between
two nodes n1 and n2 if the target of n1’s (conditional or unconditional) jump is
some instruction in n2, or if n2 contains the successive instruction that follows n1’s
conditional jump. The second case is necessary because in case of a conditional






We now detail our implementation of the learning and detection phases. For both
these phases, the probe handlers that autoscopy installs need to be as fast and efficient
as possible. Any latency incurred at this level might get exaggerated if the underlying
functions are frequently called within the kernel. For the detection phase, though
latency is not particularly an issue, since there are thousands of probes inserted by
our system, we need to make sure the OS does not get significantly slow. For the
learning phase, latency becomes a critical issue since it is the determining factor in
measuring the performance and overhead imposed by autoscopy.
We also need an implementation of a disassembler within the kernel. We use the
excellent udis86 disassembler [11], which was modified and compiled to work within
an LKM. Also, since we perform reverse disassembly (when disassembling the call
instruction within the caller function), udis86 was modified to support this mode of
operation. The query interfaces of udis86 and other library accessor functions were
used to query the current instruction and the operands that were disassembled, and
appropriate actions were taken based on the result.
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7.2 Learning Phase
The possibility of thousands (or tens of thousands) of probes to drastically slow down
or crash the system is not an unrealistic one, especially if the probe handlers are
computation intensive. Moreover, since our probe insertion algorithm is unaware
of the location of these probes, some of them may (and usually do) land in highly
sensitive areas of the kernel (such as top halves, interrupt timers, core scheduling
routines etc). Such areas of the kernel usually cannot suffer even a moderate delay in
execution time, and the kernel is prone to crashes when instrumented uncouthly in
these parts. Even “simple” operations such as tracing up a stack, or disassembling a
single instruction, or removing an existing probe are relatively expensive since they
might acquire locks, conduct exhaustive bounds checking, require initializations etc.
Hence, in order to reliably insert probes all across the kernel, our probe handlers in
this phase are highly optimized and efficient. In order to avoid expensive computation
within the handlers, we only collect the context of each probe, and delegate the actual
workload to a user-space process. Collecting probe context (we explain what we mean
by context shortly) is extremely fast, and thus allows us to insert a large number of
probes without drastically affecting system performance. While performance is not a
major concern yet, after inserting all our probes, we run LTP to exercise all parts of
the kernel, which takes a few hours. Unoptimized probe handlers can stretch LTP’s
execution time exponentially. Hence we need to ensure that overall system response
is still manageable.
Autoscopy’s implementation of the learning phase is split into two modules. One
module, which we call the Hook Analyzer (or Analyzer for short), walks the kernel
memory (using /dev/kmem), identifies all potential hooks, and subsequently feeds
them into a kernel module (which we call the Hook Collector or simply Collector)
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through a driver interface. The Collector then reads this incoming stream of addresses
and inserts probes on all of them. As mentioned before, since we do not really know
in advance which functions in the kernel we’re inserting probes on, and certain parts
of the Linux kernel are extremely time-sensitive, we use this split-module approach
to analyzing kernel hooks.
Analyzer Collector
1. Scan kernel memory and obtain
    list of potential hooks.
2. Send the list of  potential hooks.
3. Insert probes and
    collect the return
    EIP (context).
4. Send all hit probes along with context.
5. Calculate the addresses of all
    hook instructions for the probes.
6. Send the list of  hook instructions.
7. Insert probes and
    collect processor
    registers (context).
8. Send all hit probes  along with context.
9. Calculate the hook addresses
    and build table of hooks.
 
Figure 7.1: Interaction between the Analyzer and Collector during our learning phase
Figure 7.1 depicts the different steps in our learning phase and the basic interaction
between the Analyzer and Collector modules. The Collector is implemented as an
LKM and exports a driver interface that is used by both the modules for protocol
interaction and data transmission. We now go through all the steps from Figure 7.1
in detail:
1. The Analyzer scans kernel memory through the kmem interface and uses the
algorithm from section 6.2 to obtain the list of possible kernel hooks and callee
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functions.
2. The Analyzer then sends this list to the Collector.
3. The Collector inserts probes on all the callee functions. The context of a probe
at this point is the return instruction pointer (or return EIP) that identifies the
caller function.
4. After the LTP tests complete, the Collector returns back the list of all probes
that were hit. Before proceeding further, we first define a hook instruction as
the instruction that contains the hook address in the form of processor registers
and optionally an offset. In case of a memory-indirect call, the hook instruc-
tion is the CALL instruction itself, while for a register-indirect call, it is some
instruction in the caller that is present before the call in the caller’s control flow
graph.
5. The Analyzer now has a list of possible caller/callee pairs that might use function
pointers to perform the call. To verify whether a hook is indeed involved, the
Analyzer uses the kmem interface to access the kernel function, disassembles
the call, and if indirect, then disassembles the caller function, builds a control
flow graph (CFG), analyzes the operands of the call instruction, and finally
identifies the set of hook instruction(s) that contain the hook address.
6. Since we still need to obtain the processor registers when the hook instruction
was executed, the Analyzer feeds its list of hook instructions (along with the
caller-callee information) back to the Collector.
7. The Collector again inserts probes on all hook instructions and callee functions.
The context of a probe now is the processor registers (instead of the return
EIP). Hence, all probe handlers of the hook instructions collect this context,
while all probe handlers on the callee functions associate themselves with the
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hook instructions (to make sure that the registers are collected only when an
indirect call is made, and not otherwise).
8. After a second round of LTP tests, the Collector returns the set of all hit probes
along with their context to the Analyzer.
9. Finally, the Analyzer uses the context information to build a table of hook ad-
dresses, resolve all addresses into symbols, and also calculate function argument
information (explained in section 7.3).
For symbol resolution, parsing addresses, and building a table of hooks, we use
ruby scripts and a gdb back-end that uses debugging symbols from the kernel’s build
image (if available).
7.3 Detection Phase
We first detail the argument correlation process in autoscopy. Since the learning
phase has the capability to determine the prototype of the callee function, we leverage
this potential to calculate the number of arguments that a callee function expects.
For functions within an LKM, since there is no possible way for us to determine
this information, we use a heuristic and set the number of arguments as four for
such functions. Argument similarity is defined as the number of arguments that are
equivalent between two function calls. If this similarity metric exceeds half the total
number of arguments for a callee function, and the attack vector we’re searching for
is satisfied, then we report the presence of a rootkit.
Broadly, our detection inserts probes on all input callee addresses from the learning
phase, if they’re present within the core kernel. But during the learning phase, if the
callee was determined as being in an LKM, then the detection system first inserts a
probe on the caller (present within the core kernel) and when the probe is hit, moves
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the probe from the caller to the callee (present within an LKM). Whenever a callee
probe handler is called, both scenarios from section 6.3 are considered i.e. both when
a rootkit might be installed after autoscopy (detectable by moving up the stack), and
when a rootkit might already be present on the system (detectable by disassembling
the callee and inserting Type II probes recursively). If either scenario reports a hit,
then a rootkit is detected. Since we also make the assumption that the kernel text is
unmodified, we make some performance enhancements this way.
We now describe the various components present within autoscopy’s detection sys-
tem. To reiterate, Type I handlers are installed for probes detected during the learning


















Figure 7.2: Component interaction within autoscopy for the detection phase. The two
control flows originate from Type I and Type II handlers respectively.
1. Stack Verifier: The Stack Verifier is reponsible for ensuring that the current
stack is untampered and also determining the origin and type of the function
call. Reports an anomaly if it detects either an unusual stack or a control flow
anomaly, such as the presence of two indirect calls within a single control flow
that diverts flow from the core kernel to within an LKM.
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2. CFG Manager: This component constructs the CFG for the desired function
object, by using an inbuilt x86 disassembler. It is called from both Type I and
Type II handlers, and is responsible for recognizing both direct and indirect
function calls within the current function, and inserting Type II probes, if so
desired by the caller. It consults the Probe Registrar to manage the hierarchy
of probes, and the State Propagator to propagate state information across
Type II handlers.
Maintaining state information for probes is necessary since Type II handlers are
inserted for both direct and indirect function calls within LKMs; the former type
of handlers need to continue inserting probes recursively on their own functions,
while the latter need to verify their parameter list with the stack above.
3. State Recognizer: This component is only present within Type II handlers.
Acquires and validates the state information handed down by either Type I
handlers or other Type II handlers. Also checks the current control flow and
raises an alert in case of an anomaly.
4. Probe Registrar: The Probe Registrar is responsible for the insertion and
deletion of probes, and also for maintaining a record of active probes within
the system. This record is necessary for when autoscopy is uninstalled, and the
system needs to be cleaned of all probes inserted for the purposes of assisting
detection. The registrar also caches all probes, instead of continuously inserting
and removing them, which would have drastically affected system performance.
5. State Propagator: This component propagates the state information from
either Type I or Type II handlers. We note that state information is maintained
as a part of the probe structure within the kprobes framework. This is an
optimization (and can also be considered as a tiny hack) that allows us to
quickly get the context information associated with a given probe. This relieves
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us from the task of building a hash table of probe/context, which would have
been complicated, unnecessary, and expensive.
6. Anomaly Reporter: The Anomaly Reporter is responsible for reporting and
logging any detected anomaly, along with the present state of the stack and any
argument values associated with the function where the anomaly was detected.
7.4 Constructing a CFG
Constructing a CFG reliably and efficiently is critical for our system to be functional.
As mentioned before, we use udis86 as our disassembler of choice. We maintain a
queue of outstanding addresses that is initially empty. The construction of control
flow graphs is undertaken only for functions, hence the starting address of a function is
taken as input. Given this address, the CFG construction proceeds by disassembling
each succeeding instruction one by one and adding it to the current node in the graph.
If the disassembled instruction is a jmp, ret or call, then a new node is created.
If the instruction is an unconditional jump, then we take the jump (if not
already taken before) and follow the disassembly from the jump target. Else if the
jump target has already been disassembled before, we keep removing addresses from
the head of the queue until we find one that has been untraversed. We quit if the
queue becomes empty.
If the instruction is a conditional jump, we add the jump target to the tail of
the queue, and resume from the succeeding instruction. Else if the instruction is a
return, we again keep removing addresses from the queue, until we can proceed with
the disassembly. The algorithm ends when the queue has become empty.
Thus, our implementation of autoscopy is both modular and optimized for effi-
ciency. While there is the additional overhead of kprobes, as we show in the coming




Our evaluation focuses on illustrating both the efficacy of autoscopy as a detection
technique and its performance impact on a running kernel. We first give coverage
details for all hooks identified through our learning process, and also illustrate our
findings by giving a partial table of descriptions for all resolved hooks (hooks deter-
mined during our learning phase). Ideally, our full table serves as a catalogue for
kernel hooks that could be used by other detection agencies aiming to protect the
kernel. While it is not possible for us to claim that our kernel coverage is 100%,
assuming the LTP tests are extensive in breadth, these hooks should cover most of
the operating kernel.
Also, our learning and detection phases need not be limited by our existing im-
plementations. Our underlying technique is general enough to be accommodated by
a VMM, if so desired, isolation being the only advantage that can be reaped from
such an implementation. While we have not thought hard about the VMM imple-
mentation, our experience with QEMU makes us believe that it should be feasible
(and simpler to implement than our current code), especially because of QEMU and
VirtualBox’s technique of dynamically translating [16] entire basic-blocks into host
instructions. Such techniques allow us to easily install handlers for indirect call and
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jump instructions, greatly reducing code complexity.
To accommodate embedded platforms that have little native support for installing
external systems such as CoPilot (which uses a PCI interface), we advocate the use of
architecture-specific functionalities that prevent the execution of code from a memory
page that has been specifically tagged as non-executable. The modern x86 architec-
ture provides the NX bit, while the ARM architecture (ubiquitous on embedded
systems) has the “Execute Never”/XN bits within TLB entries.
If available, the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is also an effective platform to
detect violations in code integrity. A TPM is a passive hardware module that provides
secure storage and cryptographic computation outside the system processor. The
TPM offers a set of platform configuration registers (PCRs) that store hash values
from any system measurement. The process of saving a measurement hash to a PCR
is called “extending” a PCR, wherein the TPM concatenates the existing hash with
the new one, calculates the hash of this concatenated value, and finally saves it onto
the PCR.
We propose extending the appropriate PCR registers with the contents of the text,
and verifying the register contents either periodically, or when a probe is hit. This
would help detect modifications in static code or data.
Finally, if the MMU itself can be modified, then our proposal for a better pol-
icy interface at the MMU, via interaction with a customized FPGA [17] efficiently
guarantees text integrity, along with other complex policy enforcements.
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Hook Hook Caller Callee
Address Symbol Function Function
c035b64c sync cmos timer + 12 run timer softirq sync cmos clock
c035be0c cpuinfo op +8 seq read c next
c035e158 modules op +8 seq read +493 m next
c0363c38 key type keyring +24 key cleanup keyring destroy
c0314390 memory fops +48 chrdev open memory open
dfe9e564 - do tty hangup pty flush buffer
c0374ba0 ipv4 specific tcp transmit skb ip queue xmit
c0374c14 tcp prot +20 inet create raw init
c031a790 unix dgram ops +16 sys connect unix dgram connect
c035fdc0 elf format +8 search binary handler load elf binary
c03602f8 proc root operations +24 vfs readdir proc root readdir
c0372eb0 socket file ops +80 file send actor sock sendpage
c035f4bc read pipe fops+28 do poll pipe poll
Table 8.1: A partial listing of hook addresses and symbols with associated function pairs,
on Linux kernel 2.6.19-7.
8.1 Discovering Kernel Hooks
A brute-force search for hooks by scanning /dev/kmem identified 65,213 possibilities.
However, a large portion of these hooks were duplicates (they referred to locations
with the same value). Our next step was to filter out redundant hooks - after this, the
number of hook possibilities drastically reduced to 9155 (a whopping 86% reduction).
The next step, as described in section 6.2, was to insert probes on these locations, run
the LTP suite, and gather all hit probes. This phase collected 28.7% of all inserted
probes, or 2629 possible hooks. Finally, filtering these locations based on whether
they were actually called using indirect calls led us to identify 634 hooks (of these
about 160-odd were system calls. Table 8.1 shows a partial listing of kernel hooks
discovered by autoscopy. A complete listing of hooks and their associated caller/callee




We tested autoscopy’s ability to detect seven different kernel rootkits (in addition to
our proof-of-concept pattern searching rootkit, and a SCADA Modbus rootkit devel-
oped for purposes of demonstration). For eight other rootkits that were impractical
to compile and install into 2.6 kernels, we chose to conduct a source-level analysis
in order to demonstrate our detection abilities. We note that a majority of publicly
available rootkits are released to just demonstrate a proof-of-concept, and accord-
ingly our analysis targets rootkit techniques and not specific implementations. The
rootkits we tested against are shown in Table 8.2.
For the rootkits we tested, we modified them to properly resolve the kernel’s system
call table (since these rootkits modified the table and it is no longer exported in Linux
2.6.x). As expected, we were able to successfully detect and report all the rootkits,
both when they were pre-installed before our system began operation and when they
were installed after our system was present. We point out that our approach is
agnostic to the particular content or feature set of a rootkit. Rather, we detect the
behavior a rootkit must undertake to invade a system. In some sense, our detection
can be considered rootkit-agnostic (our detection approach is analogous to efforts
that focus on vulnerabilities rather than exploit content).
8.3 Detailed Rootkit Evaluations
We now evaluate our system against source-code analyses of two rootkits: adore-ng
and enyelkm. Our initial aim is to expose the hooks used by these rootkits so that
autoscopy can detect the presence of both these instances of malware.
Adore-ng is used to hide files, processes and network sockets from an IDS. It works
by hijacking hooks at the virtual filesystem (VFS) layer. The hook that is hijacked is
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Rootkit Type of Analysis Technique Placement
kbdv3 autoscopy syscall hooking LKM
override autoscopy syscall hooking LKM
enyelkm v1.0 autoscopy syscall hooking using IDT LKM
Rial autoscopy syscall hooking LKM
Synapsys v0.4 autoscopy syscall hooking LKM
Adore–ng 2.6 source-code VFS and proc hooking LKM
DR v0.1 source-code syscall hooking using DR LKM
knark–2.4.3 source-code syscall hooking Both
linspy2beta2 source-code syscall hooking LKM
phalanx–b6 source-code syscall hooking /dev/mem
Rkit–1.01 source-code syscall hooking LKM
superkit source-code syscall table duplication /dev/kmem
modhide1 source-code syscall hooking LKM
Table 8.2: Rootkits detected by our system. We distinguish between autoscopy and manual
source-code analysis.
the readdir pointer contained within the file structure for all files under a particular
filesystem. The hook is modified to point to adore proc readdir, adore’s handler,
which then calls the original function with modified arguments. The filesystems that
adore-ng considers are the root filesystem and the proc filesystem. The following code
sample from the rootkit illustrates how it hijacks these hooks:
if (orig_readdir) *orig_readdir = filep->f_op->readdir;
filep->f_op->readdir = new_readdir;
The rootkit first saves the original pointer in orig readdir, and then overwrites
it to point to new readdir. Typically, new readdir is the rootkit’s own function. We
now show that our system exposes these hooks that are used by adore. Table 8.3 is
a partial capture of our complete list that gives details of just the pertinent hooks.
In this case, there are only two: the readdir hooks of the proc and ext3 filesystems.
The actual structures used are proc root operations and ext3 dir operations -
both of type file operations. Note that the hook offset within the structure (+24) is
the same in both cases since it is essentially the same hook, just present within two
different objects. Thus we see that we’re able to successfully expose both hooks.
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Hook Caller Callee
proc root operations+24 vfs readdir proc root readdir
ext3 dir operations+24 vfs readdir ext3 readdir
Table 8.3: Hooks used by the adore rootkit. Autoscopy was able to successfully discover
both hooks.
Hook Caller Callee
sys call table sysenter past esp + 79 sys kill
sys call table sysenter past esp + 79 sys getdents64
sys call table sysenter past esp + 79 sys read
Table 8.4: Hooks used by enyelkm. Autoscopy was able to discover these hooks and detect
the rootkit.
Enyelkm is a kernel rootkit that modifies the kernel functions system call and
sysenter entry to redirect control to its own handlers while also maintaining a par-
tial copy of the system-call table so as to not modify the original (since it could be
integrity-checked by IDSes). Enyelkm redirects system-calls sys kill, sys getdents64
and sys read to its own functions that can then give root access to arbitrary pro-
cesses, hide modules, files, directories, processes or even hide chunks within a single
file. Our system exposes all three hooks modified by enyelkm and Table 8.4 gives spe-
cific details on these hooks. Since this particular rootkit does not modify the original
hooks, simple integrity checkers on the sys call table structure would fail to detect
this rootkit. However, since autoscopy uses control flow anomaly detection, we were
able to successfully detect the presence of enyelkm within our system.
8.4 Evaluating Performance Impacts
As explained in Section 7, our detection system inserts probes on hooks identified
during the discovery phase. With these probes in place, we ran a series of experiments
to determine the overhead of running our system versus an uninstrumented version
of the kernel. We first conducted three non-synthetic benchmarks: compiling the
Apache 2.2.10 Web server, creating a file from /dev/urandom, and compiling the
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Linux kernel 2.6.19.7. Since these tasks are largely I/O-bound, we expect them to
exercise the kernel significantly more than a CPU-bound process.
We have also determined the impact of two standard benchmarks: the SPEC
CPU2000 benchmark suite and lmbench. Both these benchmarks offer a wide range
of micro-benchmarking utilities that are useful for stressing particular components of
the system and for streamlining results. In the tables that follow, when reporting the
performance overhead, a minus sign before the value indicates that our autoscoped
system performed better than a native system. In these cases, we assume that the
particular scenario did not heavily exercise our autoscoped hook locations. For these
results, we also assume that our measurement values were within the statistical er-
ror. A plus sign before the value indicates that our system performed worse than the
native and the percentage value quantifies this overhead.
Benchmark Name Native (s) Autoscoped (s) Overhead
164.gzip 458.851 461.66 +0.609%
168.wupwise 420.882 419.282 -0.382%
176.gcc 211.464 209.825 -0.781%
256.bzip2 458.536 457.16 -0.303%
254.perlbmk 344.356 346.046 +0.489%
255.vortex 461.006 467.283 +1.343%
177.mesa 431.273 439.97 +1.977%
Table 8.5: SPEC CPU2000 Results. We rebooted the machine between the tests on native
and autoscopy. Each SPEC experiment was run three times: we report the median of those
runs. In the last column, a plus sign indicates that our system performed worse than the
native, and a minus sign means autoscopy imposed no measurable overhead.
We conducted seven different components of the SPEC benchmark; our results
are shown in Table 8.5. The first five benchmarks were picked for their capability to
stress parts of the filesystem and I/O, while the last two were mostly CPU intensive.
As our results indicate, autoscopy performed on par with many benchmarks. Our
“worst” performance was a 1.9% overhead for the OpenGL 177.mesa benchmark.
lmbench [19] is a micro-benchmark tool for conducting performance analysis,
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Latency Measurements Native Autoscoped Overhead
Simple syscall (µs) 0.1230 0.1228 -0.163%
Simple read (µs) 0.2299 0.2332 +1.415%
Simple write (µs) 0.1897 0.1853 -2.375%
Simple fstat (µs) 0.2867 0.2880 +0.451%
Simple open/close (µs) 7.1809 8.0293 +10.566%
Bandwidth Measurements Native Autoscoped Overhead
Mmap Read (Mbps) 6622.19 6612.64 +0.144%
File Read (Mbps) 2528.72 1994.18 +21.139%
libc bcopy unaligned (Mbps) 6514.82 6505.84 +0.138%
Memory Read (Mbps) 6579.30 6589.08 -0.149%
Memory Write (Mbps) 6369.95 6353.28 +0.262%
Table 8.6: lmbench Results. Reported values are medians obtained from multiple runs.
and we use it here to measure the latency of system calls, and also for measuring
bandwidth. For the bandwidth measurements, lmbench repeats each test for varying
amounts of data that is transferred, from about 512 bytes to 536MB. We report the
values in Table 8.6 for a median transfer size of 0.524MB. From the results, we again
notice that the performance of autoscopy is almost head to head with the native
system. But there seems to be an anomalous result for the “File Read” bandwidth
measurement. To discover the cause for this 21% overhead, we compare the overall
number and frequency of probes that were hit when this particular measurement was
conducted against the “Mmap Read” bandwidth measurement (which showed only
0.144% overhead). The only major difference between the “Mmap Read” and “File
Read” measurements are that the former maps a file into memory and works on the
mmapped version while the latter reads from disk every time.
From our measurements, we observed that 32% of probes were hit in both cases
and the probes were hit 298,632 times in the case of “File Read”, and 223,341 times
in the case of “Mmap Read”. Thus we can conclude that the overhead of the probe
handlers is relatively consistent across these two measurements, and the actual cause
of the overhead is related to the massive amounts of I/O being performed in the case
56
of “File Read”. Our hypothesis is that either the kernel is preempting the I/O path
or interfering with disk caching when probed, thus causing the identified overhead.
Benchmark Name Native (s) Autoscopy (s) Overhead
Apache httpd 2.2.10 Compilation 184.090 187.664 +1.904%
Random 256M File Creation 141.788 147.78 +4.055%
Linux kernel 2.6.19.7 Compilation 5687.716 5981.036 +4.904%
Table 8.7: Non-synthetic Benchmarks.
Our first non-synthetic test was to compile Apache under our system and compare
this with an Apache compile using a pristine kernel. We repeated the experiment
thrice under each environment, and have reported the median values in Table 8.7. Our
results show that we suffer only 1.9% of overhead. For the file creation experiment,
we ran dd specifying a block size of 1KB to create a 256MB file from /dev/urandom.
Again, we report the median values and in this case, we note that our performance
drops a little, but not considerably, to about 4%.
Finally, we compiled the Linux 2.6.19.7 kernel, and the median numbers in this
case indicate just less than 5% overhead. Since the kernel compilation process is
thorough and rigorous, stressing both the computation and I/O performance of the
system, we take this to be our worst possible case.
8.5 False Positives and False Negatives
A false negative scenario arises whenever autoscopy fails to detect a control-flow
altering rootkit when one is actually present on the system. But such a case might
occur only if the underlying hook that the rootkit modifies is not being “protected” by
autoscopy. This is not a likely scenario since our discovery system is comprehensive
enough to cover all of the kernel hooks, as we rely on LTP to hit every area of the
kernel.
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On the other hand, a false positive arises if autoscopy reports a kernel rootkit when
none actually exists on the system. With our design from Section 6.3, it is possible
to obtain false positives under the following scenario. We first define a hook type
for a hook as the combo structure offset, where structure refers to the type of
structure (C types as identified in debugging symbols) under which the hook lies (for
global hooks under no structure, the type is global), and offset is the offset of the
hook within the structure.
Now, a normal LKM installs a handler (say h1) for a hook of type t1 and another
LKM installs a handler (h2) for a hook of a different type t2. When h1 is called by
the kernel, it in turn calls (a direct call) some other kernel function which eventually
calls h2. Hence the control flow is: kernel → h1 → kernel → h2. Since h1 and
h2 are valid LKM functions, this is a valid control flow, but the presence of the two
indirect calls (to h1 and h2) would be detected by autoscopy and flagged as a rootkit
(assuming the argument lists are similar). To accommodate this scenario, we enhance
our implementation with a type checker.
Notice that the underlying hooks for h1 and h2 are of different types t1 and t2. In
fact, these types shouldn’t ever be of the same type, because that would violate the
very concept of hooks — to provide an abstract implementation layer, where each
hook accomplishes a specific functionality. For example, one would never see a read
hook function turn around and call another read hook function — it shouldn’t since
it is itself supposed to accomplish the “reading” functionalities. Thus, hook functions
of the same type should never call each other, but can call hook functions of a different
type. This is what we’re trying to distinguish, although in practice, we’ve never seen
hook functions calling other valid hook functions before.
We first build hook types for all the hooks we detect. For hook addresses that can
be resolved into symbols, we implement a DWARF [4] parser on the kernel’s debug
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image to track down the required symbols, identify the type of structure it’s enclosed
under, and the offset of the hook symbol within that structure. We feed this along
with the list of hooks to the detection system. For hooks that cannot be resolved
since they lie within dynamic memory regions, we use the caller’s function name for
structure and the offset of the call from the start of the function for offset.
Our detection system then associates each probe with the corresponding type of
hook, and whenever the system identifies a rootkit, it also verifies whether the types
of hooks used within both indirect calls are identical or not. If identical, or one of the
types is missing, then the rootkit is reported, otherwise it constitutes a false positive
and is logged as such without raising any other critical alarms.
8.6 Threats against Autoscopy
We now consider a few of the possible attacks that a rootkit might conduct against
autoscopy and also detail our countermeasures. We reiterate that since autoscopy
operates at the same privilege level as the attacker, by definition, we cannot prevent
the attacker from overwriting kernel text or any self-modification of code. We thus
rely on other approaches to guard the kernel text (taking breakpoint instructions
into account): AMD/Intel’s No-Execute (NX) bit, CoPilot [35], SWATT [12] and
similar systems. We emphasize that, by themselves, these other approaches cannot
detect even moderately sophisticated rootkits that employ some form of dynamic
hook modification or control-flow redirection. Rather, we see these tools as building
blocks to help systems such as autoscopy that are directed towards more devious
rootkits than the ones that just modify static text or data. The following are some
scenarios of how a rootkit might attempt to subvert autoscopy:
1. After getting control, the rootkit modifies the hook to point to the
original callee, then calls a kernel function that uses this hook to
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redirect flow to the orginal callee, and finally reverts the hook to
point back to the rootkit: This attempt is easily foiled by autoscopy, which
recognizes the two indirect calls even though they might potentially be situated
far apart on the stack.
2. The rootkit constructs CALL instructions manually, i.e. it saves reg-
isters and flags, pushes <args, return IP, current FP> on the stack,
and executes a JMP to the target: We detect this in the probe handler
by verifying that the last executed instruction within every function on the
stack is indeed a CALL instruction. If necessary, we can also impose that hook
functions can only be called indirectly if the CALL originates from an LKM.
3. The rootkit modifies its stack to remove the rootkit’s call frame, then
executes a JMP to the target:. By analyzing the operand of each call
instruction that we disassemble, and verifying that the call operand corresponds
to the actual function that was called, we can detect such an attack. Since the
rootkit’s hook function is now basically “missing” on the stack, but the caller’s
call operand would still contain the address of the rootkit hook, autoscopy
would be able to detect this attack.
4. The rootkit creates an alternate stack that omits the rootkit’s call
frame, modifies the stack pointer to point to the new stack, and then
executes a jump to the original callee: This is just an elaborate version of




We now discuss some of the related work in the area of rootkit detection. We consider
both static and dynamic analyses techniques, and evaluate them against autoscopy.
9.1 SBCFI
Control-flow integrity (CFI) is a security technique to ensure that the execution paths
taken by a program at runtime conform to a CFG that is compiled statically by
analyzing the program source code. Petroni and Hicks present an imitation of CFI
called state-based CFI or SBCFI [34] that validates the data structures of the kernel
and the kernel state itself as a whole instead of tracking the individual execution
branches as they occur. This has the advantage that the introspecting process can
be external to the system (in a VMM), but opens up a window during which an
ephemeral (or non-persistent) rootkit might be deployed.
Their learning process is done statically by analyzing the kernel code for global
variables and tracking their usage across the kernel, and validating them at runtime.
The static nature of their system and the inability to adapt their learning process
to the rapidly evolving Linux kernel are some shortcomings of this approach. The
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unoptimized performance of SBCFI is also shown to incur close to 40% overhead on
a typical machine running on Xen, which makes it quite unrealistic for embedded
systems.
9.2 Static Binary Analysis
Kruegel, Robertson and Vigna [28] propose a method to prevent rootkits from entering
the kernel by statically analyzing all the LKMs before they are loaded into the kernel.
Using a symbolic execution technique that “simulates the program execution using
variable names rather than actual values for input data”, the LKM’s behavior is
determined to be either conforming or surreptitious. However, a static white-list
of valid memory regions and kernel symbols are necessary in order to distinguish a
malicious LKM from an benign one. Building such comprehensive lists is of course a
huge problem for such large and constantly evolving systems. Another drawback of
this approach is that it only monitors LKM rootkits leaving the door open for kmem
rootkits, that as we’ve shown can be just as devastating to the kernel.
9.3 Paladin
Paladin [14] divides the system into two protected zones, which are safeguarded from
illegal access from rootkits, or other kinds of malware. The Memory Protected Zone
consists of the kernel hook tables and other static regions of the kernel that need to be
protected from rootkits, while the File Protected Zone consists of system binaries and
libraries that need to be prevented against modifications. Given the specifications
of these zones, Paladin uses a VMM to monitor write accesses across the system
for validity. Any time an invalid access into any of the above zones is detected, a
process-tracker component then identifies the entire process subtree for the process
that elicited the write and kills all processes within this tree. A Paladin driver resides
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on the guest machine to facilitate this process and interacts with the monitor to aid
detection. This serves as an excellent prevention mechanism too, except that the
specifications of MPZ and FPZ are again static and a comprehensive survey of them
is infeasible. Also, just monitoring for writes to specified locations and preventing
them does not prevent rootkits from hijacking function hooks within data structures
since these locations are meant to be overwritten.
9.4 HookMap
Wang et. al [47] propose a technique to uncover hooks in the kernel by tracking the
kernel-level control flow for an interested application using a QEMU-based virtual
machine monitor. Their basic idea is quite similar to ours — a rootkit wishing to
hide itself — in this case, from certain user-level applications such as ls, ps, netstat or
explicit monitoring agencies such as Tripwire [10] or AIDE [1]. To do this, a rootkit
would have to hook locations that lie in the execution paths of these programs. Hence
tracking the kernel control flow for these applications would reveal those hooks (which,
as we know, are just indirect function calls). Cataloguing the hooks would serve an
IDS that leverages these findings to protect such pointers. HookMap has the distinct
advantage of narrowing its playing field to present a concise description of just the
necessary hooks that need to be protected within the kernel. Moreover, hooks that
do not lie in the execution paths of any of these programs would still go undetected.
Our aim is broader and we cover most of the kernel hooks in the data region that
have a reasonable chance of getting manipulated by any rootkit.
9.5 NICKLE
The NICKLE system by Riley et. al [39] implements a shadow memory controlled
by a VMM for the entire region of kernel memory in the guest machine. Upon guest
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bootup, all known authenticated kernel instructions are copied into the shadow mem-
ory, and at runtime each kernel instruction fetch is verified by comparing the shadow
memory maintained by the VMM with the actual physical memory at that location.
Any differences here would indicate the presence of a rootkit, and thus prevent it
from executing on the guest system. LKMs also need to get authenticated before
their insertion since NICKLE cannot distinguish between a valid and a malicious ker-
nel module. A disadvantage of this kind of authentication scheme is that it needs to
be manually performed every time a module is inserted into the kernel, and in-depth





Detecting kernel rootkits invites a wide range of approaches — from static binary
analysis and data protection schemes to memory shadowing techniques. Most require
either a static specification of vulnerable code and data (and hence are fast), or use
VM technology to identify and shield the vulnerable portions from malicious code
(comparatively slow). Autoscopy is at the crossroads of both these approaches and
presents a manageable interface, which requires no VM complications and hence is
insusceptible to VM overhead, while at the same time is extensive enough to capture
and track the anomalous nature of misbehaving malcode.
Looking back to the period following the dawn of Unix, operating systems have been
designed to be opaque, focusing more on providing a clean interface for kernel-user
communication, rather than opening up the OS internals for any kind of meaningful
analysis. This has recently changed, with Solaris’ DTrace having probably forever
changed the way we look at operating systems today, and other similar designs such
as Kprobes cropping up in Linux and other OSes. These tools make it possible to
peer deeper into the OS than was previously possible, to gather and accumulate state,
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and allow us to reason about these states in a meaningful manner.
Given this new kind of “tracing” power, the question that then needs to be answered
is: How can we use such power responsibly? In this thesis, we attempt to provide just
such an answer — by using OS tracing frameworks to protect the OS itself — hence
the name autoscopy. Building a security layer within the OS to monitor itself also
means we can leverage this intimacy to gather as much of kernel context as needed
without the hassle of trying to bridge the VM semantic gap [20]. Finally, through
this thesis, we hope that we can fuel more thoughts and ideas about using tracing
technologies for better policy enforcement and privilege management at the OS level.
10.1 Future Work
As the implementation of autoscopy is not restricted to just using kprobes, future
work would involve implementing our detection system using a VMM for systems
that can afford to handle the extra overhead and slowdown in performance. One
possible implementation we are considering is using a processor emulator such as
QEMU [16] that also does dynamic instruction translation. This technique would
allow us to quickly trap indirect calls as they’re being executed on the guest machine,
and insert our control logic to check for the presence of anomalies.
We could also make autoscopy more judicious and adaptive in its handling of kernel
probes — for example, if the system performance drops below a certain level due
to autoscopy, we could temporarily disable certain probes along critical paths in
order to boost performance — or insert more probes if the system performance is
exceeding anticipated thresholds. Basically, probe insertion/deletion can be made
more intelligent depending on the runtime characteristics of the system.
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Other future work would involve developing hardware-based security for our de-
tection system. We can achieve rigid security by building hardware primitives that
complement our system by providing better memory guarantees for both the ker-
nel code and user level applications. We have done some preliminary work in this
direction in our proposal for a Better Mousetrap [17].
10.2 Conclusion
In this thesis, we have shown the emerging capabilities of contemporary rootkits,
and also developed an analysis engine for the kernel data, where we automatically
recover function pointer hooks used within the kernel. We then leverage our findings
by building a low-overhead, rigorous detection system for rootkits intercepting kernel
control flow. We have also evaluated our system by showing its capability to detect
real-world rootkits, and estimated its performance impact to below 5%. Thus we
believe autoscopy to be a feasible implementation ready for deployment in today’s
resource-constrained environments.
Parts of Chapters 1 to 7, and 9 are based on material from my thesis proposal [38].
Parts of Chapters 7 and 8 are also based on a paper draft currently in submission.
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Appendix A
The following two sections are code fragments from autoscopy’s implementation. Sec-
tion A.1 gives the code for installing probes on the caller, and subsequently deactivat-
ing them if the callee function is determined to be within the core kernel, or leaving
the caller probes enabled if the callee is within an LKM. Section A.2 shows how we
handle conditional branches while constructing a CFG.
A.1 Installing probes on the caller
/* if there isn’t already a probe at the caller */
if(f_getkp(ptd->from) == NULL)
{
kp = (struct kprobe*)kmalloc(sizeof(struct kprobe), GFP_KERNEL);























/* if the callee is in the core kernel, disarm the caller probe,








A.2 Handling a conditional branch during CFG
construction
while(ud_disassemble(udp)) /* disassemble from function-start */
{
mmnc = udp->mnemonic;






q_tmp = (unsigned long**)kmalloc(qnum * 4 * sizeof(unsigned long*),
GFP_KERNEL);





address_queue[q_tail++] = udp->pc + get_branch_target(udp);
if(blk_count >= bnum)
{
blk_tmp = (struct block*)kmalloc(bnum * 4 * sizeof(struct block),
GFP_KERNEL);
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